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Engaging the Mental
Wars of Our Times

by Jan van Vliet
Statement of the Challenge:
“Let’s Blame the French”
Not long ago a leading newsmagazine proclaimed
that the popular Low-Carb Atkins diet is all but
dead. The article, titled “Low-Carb Lament,” gave
statistics and documentary evidence suggesting the
rapid rise, sustained popularity, and then collapse
of the low-carb diet industry that flourished for
only about a decade.1 Even though that same lowcarb diet is again becoming popular with the advent of the paleolithic diet,2 its rise and fall might
be a good metaphor for this question of postmodernism: Do there lie within postmodernism the
Dr. Jan van Vliet is Professor of Economics at Dordt
College. His most recent publication is The Rise of Reformed
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seeds of its own destruction?
A new ethos has become overwhelmingly dominant in the academy. Whether its attendant mood
was first pitched from this particular gatekeeper—academia—or from another, as some would
argue, doesn’t really matter. “Postmodernism” has
now gained admission into the culture at large.
This new spirit rather successfully insinuated itself within the icons of early 21st–century Western
civilization. By this I mean the institutions regulating political-economic life, the media, fashion,
Hollywood, art, architecture, and, yes, even some
quarters of the church, that old bastion of tradition
and “truth.” But Postmodernism has gone further
than merely insinuation, although this is always a
first and necessary step. It is responsible for the reconstruction of pretty much everything, from office buildings to systems of thought. It has come to
roost, permanently it would appear (if it really ever
left at all), in the ivory tower of the academy, from
whence it now promulgates its “new” philosophy.
It was only after a French intellectual elite articulated its opposition to certain Enlightenment
principles that “postmodernism” became common
currency. Now, this turn is not necessarily bad; I
think it is generally agreed that all new systems of
thought, theologies, belief systems are created almost overwhelmingly because of initial opposition
to existing norms and patterns. But this oppositional stance is hardly how new life is sustained. In
other words, some positive distinctives must shine
forth from the new system of thought, in this case,
to lend it credibility and provide its permanent authenticity and legitimacy. That is to say, we derive
our enduring identity from what we are, not from

what we oppose. And postmodernism has certainly
done this as well. That is why we call it “deconstruction” rather than “destruction.”
In its opposition to Modernism, the postmodern mind identifies itself as placing the central assumptions of Enlightenment epistemology under
interrogation. These assumptions have to do with
the following Enlightenment myths:
1) the myth of progress: not necessarily
good, from our observations of known
realities;
2) the myth of truth: not certain and purely
rational, but instead emotive and intuitive and discovered in community;
3) and the myth of knowledge: not objective, because historically and culturally
conditioned.

In the face of the postmodern
claim (itself totalizing, notice)
that truth is found only in
community, it is notable that
Bloom uses this concept of
“community” to describe that
one universal group of seekers of
transcendent truth.
In fact, this postmodern idea extends beyond
our perceptions of truth to its essence: there is
no absolute truth. Truth only exists relative to
the community in which its believer participates.
These ideas, it is held, are the logical outgrowth
of the chief emblems of Modernism—Western
dominance, Christianity, free market economics, and individualism. This about-face from the
Modernist assumptions—the “post-modern turn”
—has led to an “uncentering” (decentering?) of
the ethos of society, what Michel Foucault (192684) calls “heterotopia.” It is heterogeneity that
most captures 21st–century pluralism.
This decentered ethos drives—and is itself
driven by—a literary theory called deconstruction.
This theory has great import for “doing theology.”
Because there can be no totalizing epistemological

frame of reference (overwhelming ethos), knowledge has been replaced with interpretation (specific
impact). And while the vehicle of communication
is still language, language is itself interpretation.
Truth, then, is a construct of its discourse.3 To see
truth otherwise is to impose one’s value-laden and
totalizing meanings on another. Foucault, nothing
if not consistent, argued that this imposition is the
ultimate act of aggression. Communication thus
becomes hostile discourse, dangerous in its subversive tendencies because of the implicit exertion of
illegitimate power. Although Foucault died before
he could make this final assertion, to take his position to the logical conclusion would be to say that
the optimal world is the world of silence.
More to the point for our purposes, post-structuralist Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) sought to
destroy all writing by demonstrating its inevitable
falsehood. As the “chief theoretical architect of deconstruction,”4 Derrida applied very specifically to
literary theory the more comprehensive attitude
and practice applied to all human knowledge,
language, and behavior. Broadly speaking, the
purpose of deconstruction was an exposé of the
West’s singularly oppressive treatment of all nonWestern people groups, women, non-Caucasians,
and non-heterosexuals. This oppression resulted
from the prevailing social constructs (what I have
called cultural gatekeepers), which reflected superiority, prejudice, aggression, and marginalization.
Everyday language is not neutral, said Derrida,
echoing Foucault. Literary theory must be overhauled, and it must lose its claim to meaning.
In this regard it was not all well, however, between Foucault and Derrida. Because Foucault
saw Descartes as the epitome of the Age of Reason,
Derrida held that Foucault, in using the language
of reason to defend Descarte’s method, was himself a victim (and thus product) of Enlightenment
thinking and thus betrayed himself as a subscriber
to the Enlightenment’s prevailing episteme.
According to Derrica, a text does not necessarily reflect one prevailing power structure; instead,
any text can hold a multitude of interpretations,
even if the author’s own meaning can be ascertained. What is important, no, the only thing possible, is interpretation because the author himself
or herself cannot escape his or her own ties to the
Pro Rege—September 2014
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episteme of the prevailing culture. All meaning,
then, is socially contrived, so there can be no totalizing meaning/truth. In fact, “objectivity” and
“truth” are myth, a group’s story. By definition,
then, to claim objective truth for your “story” is to
dismiss all others’ stories or “truths” as false.
Meeting The Challenge in the Theological Task:
Or “How We Got Here”
In this “postmodern”5 period, when all stories
claim equal validity, Nancey Murphy reminds us
that fundamentalism and liberalism have proceeded along separate theological tracks but all
the while are indebted to one intellectual lineage,
joined at the philosophical hip, so to speak. The
track, she says, begins at the trunk from rationalist Descartes (1596-1650); proceeds along the
thought of the first of the holy trinity of classical British empiricists, John Locke of tabula rasa
fame (1632-1704); and ends with the third, skeptic Scotsman David Hume (1711-76). And here
comes the fork in the road. It was “common sense”
realist Thomas Reid (1710-96) who built upon
this common intellectual dependency to provide
the superstructure of the Princeton theology (and
thus fundamentalism/evangelicalism). The theological counterpart, liberalism, driven by co-dependent Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834),
had its post-Humean origins with Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804), whose dogmatic slumber was so
rudely interrupted by empiricist Hume’s radical
skepticism. Recognizing this common intellectual
heritage helps us set up our theological how-to
model, conceived a little more broadly.
But we must go beyond mere recognition of
these common intellectual roots. We are called to
defend the concept of transcendent truth, a norm
for belief and behavior that is beyond and above
ourselves. There is, I want to argue, a real and true
metaphysic. What’s more, this truth can be known
truly, if not exhaustively. There is a true and discoverable ontology, epistemology, and ethic. And
those are grounded in the creator/creature relationship. These are the foundations and presuppositions upon which the task of pedagogy and
learning progress. We do not have the luxury to
engage in abstract philosophizing for its own sake,
although there is fundamentally nothing wrong
12
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with seeking truth as an end in itself. One will
ultimately be led to contemplation of the divine,
even by this route. But this is not Athens of old.
So I want to bring one more weapon (is this not
just one more dimension of the current “cultural
wars”?) into my methodological armory.
I introduce the thought of one Allan Bloom, a
“front-line fighter in the mental wars of our times.”6
In 1987 this highly-esteemed Jewish-American intellectual rocked first the academic world and then
mainstream culture with his massive critique of
American (read Western) education:
The real community of man, in the midst of all
the self-contradictory simulacra7 of community, is
the community of those who seek truth, of the
potential knowers . . . of all men to the extent they
desire to know. But in fact, this includes only a
few, the true friends, as Plato was to Aristotle at
the very moment they were disagreeing about the
nature of the good. They were absolutely one soul
as they looked at the problem. This, according to
Plato, is the only real friendship, the only real common good. . . . They have a true community that is
exemplary for all the other communities.8

In the face of the post-modern claim (itself totalizing, notice) that truth is found only in community, it is notable that Bloom uses this concept
of “community” to describe that one universal
group of seekers of transcendent truth. Other communities, claims Bloom, are but “simulacra,” pretenders, to true community. And he does so in
language that we (and even his 1987 contemporaries) would consider highly politically incorrect
(because it is totalizing and oppressive). The motive for Bloom’s remarks, the form and content,
the words used and the message conveyed (Man,
Truth, Knowers, the Good) must sound odd,
even offensive to (post)modern ears. How would
Foucault or Derrida respond to such “totalizing”
claims? The line is drawn in the sand.
Why does Bloom make this assertion? In his
penetrating and luminous analysis of what he calls
“the closing of the American mind,” Bloom suggests that Descartes and Pascal “afford a peculiar
and powerful perspective on life’s perennial problems. They weave the fabric of souls.”9 The intellectual history and literary tradition of (first, France,

and then) the West, has historically produced what
he terms a “cast of mind:”
Descartes and Pascal represent a choice between
reason and revelation, science and piety, the choice
from which everything else follows…. These great
opponents, whom no synthesis can unite…set
in motion a dualism that we recognize when we
speak of both French clarity and of French passion…. Both Enlightenment and Catholic thought
have found their special home in France for more
than three centuries. Descartes and Pascal gave accounts . . . of the West’s common faith, Christianity, and at the same time situated them with respect
to that other, more distant, source of inspiration,
Greece.10

Bloom even asserts that the ground of this
“common faith” was the Bible. Scripture is a
“means to furnish the mind,” for a “life based on
the Book is closer to the truth [;…] it provides
the material for deeper research in and access to
the real nature of things…. [W]ithout a book of
similar gravity, the mind remains unfurnished.”11
These resources deepen and broaden our intellectual horizon in our search for ultimate meaning.
In consequence, Bloom’s assessment of the poststructural drift in Western culture is not optimistic. The postmodern ethos, laments Bloom, is the
final, and not entirely unexpected, step in the utter
dissolution of the search for meaning in the West:
[Postmodernism] is the last predictable stage in
the suppression of reason and the denial of the
possibility of truth in the name of philosophy….
A cheapened interpretation of Nietzsche liberates
us from the objective imperatives of the texts that
might have liberated us from our increasingly low
and narrow horizon.12

Before we proceed to our lesson from history
and then to a brief examination of what we can
learn from this for the task of doing theology in the
21st–century postmodern ethos, consider a brief
word on Blaise Pascal (1623-62).13 Interestingly,
the skeptical arguments raised in his Pensees
were originally intended to deny the possibility of knowledge. But like Descartes’ Meditations,
Pascal’s work tries to apply them to a positive end.
Pascal demonstrates the explanatory superiority of
Christianity that makes Christian belief rational.

Thus, even while holding that “the heart has its
reasons which reason does not know,” Pascal works
in the shadow of Descartes. The former’s unique
apologetic attempt makes singular reliance on reason and probability (or relies solely on reason and
probability?). It is only in the context of his broader Pensees that a distinct presuppositional approach
becomes evident. Only in this way can he use reason (practical) to demonstrate the inadequacy of
reason (evidential).
In addressing the task of theology, can we be
refreshingly syncretistic? Can we have our epistemological cake and eat it too? Why can we not
have God, Descartes, and Pascal, all three? I suggest that this approach may be the only hope we
have to do theology in this post-Enlightenment
context.
Having set the rules of the game, so to speak,
(common intellectual heritage, the centrality of
“community” as seekers of transcendent truth,”
and Pascal’s bold use of reason to supplant its own
centrality), I now want to illustrate how this kind
of a model can help us in the theological task. We

Puritan theologian William
Ames (1576–1633)
came on the scene in the
development of theological
system at a time when the
influence of Aristotle had
made significant resurgence
in the academies of Europe.
can learn from a great example of pre-Enlightenment philosophical/epistemological syncretism
that gave post-Reformation theology a very strong
push in the direction of further development and
refinement: the theologian William Ames.
A Lesson from the Early Seventeenth Century:
“Or Jerusalem and Athens and the French”
Puritan theologian William Ames (1576-1633)
Pro Rege—September 2014
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came on the scene in the development of theological system at a time when the influence of Aristotle
had made significant resurgence in the academies
of Europe. Stripped of his academic degrees at the
University of Cambridge in 1610 for refusing to
relent of a “rigid” sort of Puritanism, Ames set
off for the refreshingly freer intellectual climes of
the United Provinces. After brief sojourns in The
Hague, Leiden, and Dordrecht, where he was advisor to the president of that great synod (1618),
he was appointed to the faculty of the Franeker
Academy in 1620. It was from this intellectual
backwater that Ames wielded tremendous power
and influence from study and lectern and, occasionally, from pulpit. With the likes of Ames on
its faculty, however, the reputation of Franeker
rapidly and ever so briefly came to rival the better-known and prestigious University of Leiden.
Indeed, it was to this geographical outpost of early
modern Europe that the brightest students from
all corners of Europe gravitated. Interestingly, one
Rene Descartes enrolled April 16, 1629, surely
among the most famous of Franeker’s early seventeenth-century students. It was in Franeker, right
under the nose of Ames, that Descartes composed
his Meditations (while Discourse was written in
Leeuwarden, the capital of Friesland). “I think
I have found,” he wrote in 1630, “how one can
demonstrate metaphysical truth in such a way
which is more evident than the demonstrations of
geometry.”14 Now it is highly unlikely he learned
this in the Learned Doctor Ames’ class on Moral
Theology.
The Academy had been established in 1585
to perpetuate the Calvinistic faith in northern
Netherlands. But the legacy of Aristotle reigned
supreme, and Ames found himself doing intellectual/theological battle on three fronts rather than
the two which he was expecting, in which he was
specialist, and for which he had been appointed
to the faculty. Thus, in addition to the war against
popery and Arminianism, in the form of Jesuit
Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Jacobus
Arminius (1560-1609) and his ilk respectively,
Professor Ames was pushed into battle with the
ghost of Aristotle in the form of faculty colleagues.
For our purposes, it is of great interest how
this war was fought. Ames retained significant
14
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traces of Aristotle’s method, even as he eschewed
The Philosopher’s metaphysic. For Ames there was
no place for speculative philosophy, only biblical
revelation. Aristotle drove a bifurcation between
speculative science (theoretical) and practical science (ethics). This Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and practical, Ames held, had
no place in the Protestant academy. In fact, he
appropriated wholesale the entire epistemological
content of one Peter Ramus (1515-72), the spectacular French philosopher of the sixteenth century who was killed in the famous massacre of St.
Bartholomew’s Day in Paris. As a French Humanist
and pedagogue, Ramus sought to democratize
education and came into immediate conflict
with the more aristocratic tradition of Scholastic
method (Aristotle). Following his conversion and
as a Hugenot, Ramus believed that concepts and
abstractions of the human mind draw their validity, not from temporal or expedient constructs but
from eternal truth in the mind of God. Universals,
he held, are inferred from humanity’s experience
and then related to infinity; they are not known
through syllogistic argumentation from universal
principles that are merely probable. Absolute truth
becomes available through the careful analysis of
human perception. These facts could be analyzed
in a series of successive dichotomies. This method
of logic came to be called the Ramist method. And
the only and ultimate goal of the Ramist philosophy was the practical utility of the arts (learning)
for everyday life. Ramism came to be considered a
genuinely Christian, even Calvinistic philosophy.15
The sea change that Ames’ appropriation
of Ramism meant for traditional developing
Reformation theology can be seen in his definition
of theology. “Theology,” opined Ames, “is the doctrine or teaching [doctrina] of living to God.” In
one sentence he dismissed all earlier rationalistic
definitions of theology by centering sacred doctrine in what one did.
At the same time, however, Ames knew how
to despoil the Egyptians. Syllogistic reasoning had
a central place in the logic of “Dr. Dialectician”
himself, even as he dismissed the author. Aristotle
could still be plundered. Aristotle could make
sense of observed reality by reasoning syllogistically from major premise to conclusion in the fol-

lowing way:
Major premise: “All men are mortal” [universal
from observed experience];
Minor premise: “Socrates is a man” [from observation];
Deduction: “Socrates is mortal” [necessary
conclusion].
Ames could conclude from the major premise with
the use of scriptural principles:
Major premise: “He that lives in sin shall die”
[universal from scripture];
Minor premise: “I live in sin [judgment of
the conscience measuring behavior against
the synderesis, the standard of scripture, the
moral law];
Deduction: “ I shall die” [necessary conclusion].
Ames’ deductive logic is syllogistically demonstrated precisely as Aristotle would have required, with
this exception: Scripture represents the eternal and
abiding universals and the measure against which

We recognize the existence of
transcendent truth that we
as image-bearing creatures of
God are equipped to access.
the minor premise is judged. The conclusion (deduction) flows purely from measuring behavior
against Scripture and then submitting to scriptural
universals (the major premise). Ames demonstrates that what some consider to be the intellectually vilest and most brutish form of Aristotelian
reductionism can be applied to sacred truth.
This demonstration shows, however briefly,
that during this pre-Enlightenment period there
were many points of intersection among Aristotle,
Descartes, rationalism, Scripture, and the task of
theology. Rationalism was there; Descartes just
hadn’t articulated it yet. And what Derrida said of
Foucault, we could say of Pascal: he, too, was immersed in Descartes. If Ames had lived even a halfgeneration longer, he would have been sandwiched
between Aristotle and Descartes. Where would he
have settled?16 The difference lies in the presuppo-

sitions one brings to the epistemological task. And
this is exactly my point. Without an authoritative
outside source, we come ungrounded, decentered,
and have no functional operational grid in which,
in this case, to do theology. We saw that both
Ames and Pascal used the available epistemological techniques to advance theology as, ultimately,
something you do. Science advances piety.
Application for Today: “Will That Be French
Cuisine or the Atkins Diet?”
Suggestions and recommendations on how to
do theology in this current intellectual climate
abound. An entire sub-industry has developed
around this issue. Publications of all manner proliferate, from popular how-to’s to heavier tomes
and more significant assessments and evaluations.
I am not going to repeat these here, although I will
use some of the ideas proposed. But first, let’s go to
a recent news report for inspiration.
It might be true that our mental health, in its
totality, has been for too long dominated by the
high carb bread and pasta created on the epistemological threshing floor of the Modernity project.
Perhaps not all progress is good. It demonstrably
has not been good for all. Perhaps we have been
too glib in the “certainty” of our version of the
truth and have been closed to the clamor of other
voices, raised often in opposition. But should we
cut out an entire food group? Are the high-fat,
high-cholesterol foods offered by post-structuralism really that good for us as a singular dietary
source? We are prepared and advised to jettison the
old thinking that you can’t get enough protein, but
too much of the protein of poststructuralism is not
good either. It comes with all that unhealthy fat
and cholesterol. Does this not argue for balance,
for revisiting how truth is interpreted and delivered?
In adjusting to the intellectual and epistemological exigencies of today, we are called to re-examine our diet. Whatever diet we choose, we must
all agree that we do need food. It is a question of
finding the balanced diet that meets and exceeds
all competing claims and interpretations of the
truth.
But there are some irreducible minima in
whatever diet we adopt. My survey from the availPro Rege—September 2014
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able epistemological (and theological) smorgasbord leads me to load my plate with at least the
following non-negotiable food groups:
(1) We recognize the existence of transcendent
truth that we as image-bearing creatures of God are
equipped to access. Theories of “truth” which deny
the correspondence view ultimately fall short.17 In
other words, our theories correctly describe reality,
which exists independent of any knower. Reality
is not a social construct. This world has objective
features of the good, the true, and the beautiful to
which we can make appeal. The problem lies with
us. Pascal said “truth is so obscured nowadays,
and lies so well established, that unless we love the
truth we shall never recognize it.”18 Perhaps the
deconstructionists rather than Bible believers are
the obscurantists. Truth “must have its way with
us.” We have not handled truth properly. We have
not understood truth truly. We have not sought
truth unswervingly. We have not pursued truth
conscientiously. We have not commended it to
others compellingly. We have not applied truth
consistently in our presentation of theology and
in listening to other peoples’—other communities’—stories. That we must repent of. Because
we do not live up to the standard does not mean
we throw away the standard and seek new ones or
deny claims to any standard. “For the idea of truth
is part of the intellectual oxygen we breathe.”19
(2) The truth of which we speak and from
which we derive universal meaning is found in
Scripture. Scripture is our basic source of evidence because inspired and infallible. The text of
Scripture yields its meaning absolutely and truly.
We understand it neither truly nor exhaustively.
We have grossly underestimated the noetic effects of sin if we have thought about it at all. We
have used language wrongly. And there is a way in
which we must listen better to the marginalized
voices as we seek to appropriate biblical truth. I see
Scripture as theology’s “foundation,” both propositional and functional.
(3) There is a transcendent metanarrative. The
problem is in my telling of it, in my interpretation of it. Certain things are ontologically true.
Not all evangelical theology can be written off to
“the legacy of Protestant scholastic rationalism.”
Who would have thought that the arms of the
16
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Princeton/Westminster theology had such a reach
for the worse!20 If you are a broad-sweeping Nancey
Murphy-style anti-foundationalist in theological
construction, then Scripture can claim no authority. In her world, narrative hermeneutic is to be
applied to even the most didactic text.21 Doctrines
were developed through history to shape the life of
the Christian community. There lies in the biblical
narrative the Christian worldview.
(4) But as a member of the community of faith
I don’t interpret only in light of my own community. It is not the postmodern understanding
of community-derived truth which coexists easily alongside other such truths. The comfortable
coexistence of such truths entails a radical kind
of relativism. But it is also recognizing that doctrines of the “community of faith” do not set the
“rules for discourse,” as Kevin Vanhoozer has so
rightly reminded us. Authority does not reside in
how Christian readers of Scripture use Scripture;
doctrinal authority derives from how the biblical authors, authorized by God’s Spirit, use terms
such as “God,” “grace,” and “salvation.” This is
how the transcendent metanarrative must be told.
Vanhoozer’s approach preserves Scripture as the
Church’s foundation of faith, retains the correspondence theory of truth, and refreshingly—no,
necessarily—reminds us of the Reformation principle of the priesthood of individual believers in
our efforts to do theology rightly because we have
the capacity—and therefore the responsibility—to
do it rightly. He says,
Right theological judgment is the product of human cognitive action that has been nurtured by divine canonical action concerning right covenantal
relations. The canon is nothing less than a unique
and indispensable framework—the spectacles of
faith, as Calvin put it—that enables us faithfully
to imagine (to see and to taste) the world as it is in
Christ, the “wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24), or in
other words, as it really is.22

(5) One more word on method, and that is humility. At times our approach has been triumphal.
We have played fast and loose with the biblical
message because it is the truth. But we have been
unfaithful to the task to which we have been called.
Have we arrogantly imposed our own (typically

Western) “narrative-based experience” on foundational truth, even as we sought to share its propositional nature? A good argument could be made
that the fundamental doctrines of the faith have
been affirmed in an unwarranted triumphalism
that has led to an arrogant elitism. Although there
is a place for holy anger and righteous indignation
(as Jesus himself showed us), such is typically not
the winsome route. The epistemic humility virtuously invoked by some post-structuralists—that
you really can’t know anything for certain—I want
to invoke too, but not as an apology by which I
can now dismiss the indubitability of Christian
theism. A new fresh humility can characterize our
approach to both the appropriation and the promulgation of scriptural truth. There can be no doubt
about its veracity.
(6) Finally, we view humanity as unified in its
constitution. Perhaps the more radical postmodernists are the product of the fragmentation of
the unified individual? Why such a distinction
between the intellect, the will, and the affections?
It appears postmodernists would have us all be
the epistemological fatalities of faculty psychology, itself a late-Enlightenment emblem. But that
is not how Scripture presents humanity created
in God’s image-bearing capacity. This was always
Princeton’s emphasis (Charles Hodge’s, especially).
This was the grand presupposition of William
Ames as he chafed against the Aristotelian division
between knowing and doing, epistemology and
ethics. This is where Ramus came in. Without this
synergistic understanding of the faculties of humanity, our understanding of reason will only be
seriously attenuated. Reason is also moral and not
merely rational. It is surely true that the Modern
mind represents the best example in history of human pride in the exaltation of the human intellect.
But it is the intellect engaging an outside authority that makes it moral and “non-neutral.”23 Ames
took Aristotle, brought the foundational truth of
Scripture to bear, and with the pedagogically-oriented epistemological equipment of Ramus, made
it functional as well.24
In conclusion, I would suggest that we recover the center as we apply these principles to our
appropriation, understanding, and teaching of
theology. And we will do this in community in a

spirit of cooperation and humility as members of
a community, that “community of those who seek
truth,” to use Bloom’s phrase, that universal, supracultural, timeless truth. And whether Bloom is
right that “postmodernity is a fad,” much like the
Atkins Diet appears to have been, perhaps news
of its death is exaggerated. Whatever the case, we
need to enter the conversation as disputants more
than “conversers” because the “disputation model,” argues Vanhoozer, better captures the seriousness of the matter.25
Meanwhile, I want to assert that in this disputation model we can and must use Aristotle,
Descartes, Pascal, and pre-existing epistemological
methodology and categories to arrive at the truth
as it is in Scripture. Only in Scripture are Pascal
and Descartes not those “great opponents, whom
no synthesis can unite.”26 We can use both to
find God, not exclusively, but as one of our main
food groups. And, at the very least, Foucault and
Derrida provide interesting appetizers.
That’s my diet, and I’m sticking with it. Bon
Appetit.
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